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This paper builds upon, but substantially revises, John Harsanyi’s concept
of ‘extended preferences’. An individual ‘history’ is a possible life that some
person (a subject) might lead. Harsanyi supposes that a given spectator,
formulating her ethical preferences, can rank histories by empathetic
projection: putting herself ‘in the shoes’ of various subjects. Harsanyi then
suggests that interpersonal comparisons be derived from the utility function
representing spectators’ (supposedly common) ranking of history lotteries.
Unfortunately, Harsanyi’s proposal has various flaws, including some that
have hitherto escaped scholarly attention. In particular, it ignores the limits
of personal identity. If the subject has welfare-relevant attributes that the
spectator cannot acquire without changing who she is, full empathetic
identification of the latter with the former becomes impossible. This paper
proposes instead to use sympathy as the attitude on a spectator’s part that
allows us to make sense of her extended preferences. Sympathy – an attitude
of care and concern – is a psychological state quite different from empathy.
We should also allow for hetereogeneity in spectators’ extended preferences.
Interpersonal comparisons emerge from a plurality of sympathetic
spectators, not (as per Harsanyi) from a common empathetic ranking.

1. INTRODUCTION
Welfare economics has never resolved the puzzle of interpersonal
welfare comparisons. While some economists continue to hold the view
Many thanks to Koen Decanq, Marc Fleurbaey, Francois Maniquet and an anonymous
referee for Economics and Philosophy for very helpful comments. All errors are my own.
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(dominant around the middle of the 20th century) that such comparisons
are to be avoided, there are many subfields of modern economics
where interpersonal comparability is accepted. In particular, this is true
of subfields that use ‘social welfare functions’ to evaluate policies or
institutions. The social-welfare-function framework works as follows. A
policy or institution corresponds to some probability distribution across
possible outcomes. Each outcome, in turn, corresponds to a vector of
utility numbers – one for each of the individuals in the population, with
ui (x) the utility of a given individual i in a given outcome x. Outcomes are
ordered using some rule for ranking their corresponding utility vectors.
Critically, the social-welfare-function framework presupposes that
utility numbers represent inter- as well as intrapersonal well-being
comparisons. The numerical fact that ui (x) > u j (y) is supposed to indicate
the well-being fact that individual i in outcome x is better off than
individual j in outcome y. But what is the basis for this supposed wellbeing fact?
Economists, at least, tend to reduce well-being to preferences. Each
individual is seen to have preferences over outcomes. An outcomepreference is a psychological state on the part of the holder of the
preference, which takes the form of a relation between him and outcomes
(individual i prefers outcome x to outcome y), and plays the psychological
role of motivating his choices (depending on the possible outcomes of the
choices available to him). While each individual’s outcome-preferences
seem to offer a straightforward basis for well-being facts regarding that
individual – if individual i prefers outcome x to y, then he is better
off in x than y, or so economists usually suppose – these preferences
provide no apparent basis for well-being comparisons across persons.
How are we to move from a relation between a particular person and
outcomes, to an interpersonal well-being comparison – which is a relation
involving outcomes and multiple persons? This, in a nutshell, is the puzzle
of interpersonal comparisons; and welfare economics has yet to arrive at
a clear, consensus solution to it.
In this paper, I propose a solution to the puzzle.1 The solution is based
upon the idea of ‘extended preferences’ – an idea that John Harsanyi
pioneered,2 and that other scholars have employed as well.3 An extended
1

2

3

The concept of ‘equivalent income’ provides a different possible solution. Fleurbaey and
Blanchet (2013: ch. 4); Fleurbaey (forthcoming). I contrast equivalent incomes and extended
preferences in Adler (forthcoming).
Harsanyi (1977: ch. 4). See also Harsanyi (1953, 1955, 1982). For a lucid presentation of
Harsanyi’s views, see Weymark (1991); Mongin and d’Aspremont (1998: 444–459); Mongin
(2001).
For a review of the broader literature on extended preferences, see Suzumura (1996).
Recent examples include Gajdos and Kandil (2008); and Grant et al. (2010, 2012a, 2012b).
This literature is also discussed by Mongin and d’Aspremont (1998: 444–459); Mongin
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preference is a ranking, not of outcomes, but of histories: pairings of
outcomes and individuals (‘subjects’).
However, Harsanyi’s specific conception of ‘extended preferences’ is
problematic. His is an empathy-based conception. On this view, a person (the
‘spectator’) develops extended preferences via empathetic projection. She
compares histories by considering what it would be like for her to ‘stand
in the shoes’ of each subject – to acquire the attributes that each subject has
in his history. The empathy-based conception of extended preferences has
two key flaws. (1) The essential attribute problem. There are attributes that
subjects might possess which the spectator necessarily lacks: attributes
that the spectator cannot acquire without changing who she is. Insofar
as subjects possess these properties, the spectator cannot really ‘stand in
their shoes’. (2) The ‘wrong kind of preference’ problem. The spectator might
develop an extended preference for reasons that have nothing to do with
well-being, e.g. for moral reasons. Where some or all spectators have
the ‘wrong kind of preference’ for one history over a second, it would
be unwarranted to use these preferences as the basis for a well-being
comparison between the histories.
Part 2 of the paper sets forth both the general concept of extended
preferences, and Harsanyi’s empathy-based conception thereof. Part 3
criticizes the empathy-based conception. The presentation and critique
in these parts are focused on Harsanyi’s scholarship – since his writings
about extended preferences have been highly influential and, in his book
(1977), are quite fully developed. But let me suggest (without exhaustively
demonstrating) that other writers about extended preferences have also
tended to adopt the problematic view that a spectator develops an
extended preference over histories by empathetically projecting herself
into the positions of the histories’ subjects.4

4

(2001), and placed in a yet broader intellectual tradition of ‘impartial observer’ theories
of morality.
To be sure, much work on extended preferences is formal. Preferences over histories are
defined as abstract objects, i.e. rankings, and the logical consequences of various axiomatic
restrictions on these rankings and associated social welfare functions are explored. Such
axiomatic analysis does not depend upon the interpretation of such rankings – the
psychological content ascribed to them. However, to the extent that scholars in this area
do express a position on the psychological content of an extended preference, they seem to
see it as a preference to acquire the subject’s attributes. See, e.g. Sen (1970: 131, 152); Arrow
(1977: 224–225); Grant et al. (2010: 1957–1958; 2012b: 834–835).
Unfortunately, this empathy-based interpretation of an extended preference is obscured
by terminology. The term ‘extended sympathy’ is sometimes used to describe the generic
concept of extended preferences (which is neutral between empathy- and sympathy-based
approaches) and, indeed, even to refer to the empathy-based conception. For example, in
his survey of the extended-preferences literature, Kotaro Suzumura writes: ‘Interpersonal
welfare comparisons of the so-called extended sympathy type may be formulated in
operational form as follows: it is better in my judgement to be put in your position in social
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Still, extended preferences remain a fruitful basis for interpersonal
comparison. In Part 4, I propose to analyse them in terms of sympathetic
rather than empathetic spectators. This sympathy-based conception
derives a spectator’s ranking of histories from her ranking of outcomes
under a condition of care and concern for subjects, and from her wellbeing judgements. In Parts 5 and 6, I discuss how the sympathy-based
conception provides the tools for constructing interpersonal comparisons
of well-being levels and differences.
The terms ‘sympathy’ and ‘empathy’ are often used interchangeably,
or without close attention to their meaning. But the terms are not
synonyms; they pick out two, quite distinct psychological states. And this
difference, I suggest, has real significance for welfare economics, since by
attending to it we can make progress on the problem of interpersonal
comparisons.
Finally, I should note that the analysis in this paper is independent of
debates about the appropriate form of the social welfare function. While
Harsanyi developed the concept of extended preferences in the course of
his defence of utilitarianism, interpersonal comparisons of levels and/or
differences are also generally required for non-utilitarian social welfare
functions (for example, leximin or ‘prioritarian’ functions). The sympathybased conception I develop is meant to mesh with such functions, as well
as with utilitarianism.5
2. INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS, EXTENDED PREFERENCES AND
HARSANYI’S APPROACH
Formally, the problem of interpersonal comparisons can be expressed
as follows. Let O be a set of outcomes, i.e. states of affairs, {x, y, z . . .}.
Let N be a set of individuals, {1, 2, . . . , N}. N has a finite number of
members N, each of whom exists in all of the outcomes (problems
of variable and infinite populations are ignored here). A well-being
comparison is not a ranking of outcomes, simpliciter, but rather
a ranking of outcomes relativized to individuals. We say that one
outcome is better for Jim than a second – and, if interpersonal
comparisons are possible, that Sheila is better off in some outcome
than Jim in some outcome. This relativization can be captured via
the concept of an individual ‘history’. As I will define it, a history
(x; i) is a pairing of an individual, i, and an outcome, x. The set H is the set

5

state x than to be put in somebody else’s position in social state y’ (1996: 202). Suzumura
uses the term ‘sympathy’ to mean what is properly called ‘empathy’.
Whatever the form of the social welfare function, important questions arise about how it
should incorporate the information in WB and DIFF if these well-being structures are not
represented by a single utility function. This is a topic I have addressed elsewhere, and will
not discuss here. See Adler (2012: chs 2, 5).
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of all histories. In other words, H is O × N. A well-being ranking, denoted
‘WB ’, is a quasiordering on H.‘(x; i)WB (y; j)’ should be interpreted as
‘individual i in outcome x is at least as well off as individual j in outcome
y’. Having strictly greater well-being (WB ) and being equally well off
(WB ) are derived from WB in the standard way.
A quasiordering, recall, is a binary relation which is transitive and
reflexive but not necessarily complete.6 For a given pair of histories (x;
i) and (y; j), it is possible that neither (x; i)WB (y; j), nor (y; j)WB (x; i).
We can therefore say that WB makes some interpersonal comparisons
iff: there exists at least one pair of histories (x; i) and (y; j), with i and j
distinct individuals (i  j), such that (x; i)WB (y; j). Conversely, WB is
only intrapersonally comparable iff, for every pair of histories such that
(x; i)WB (y; j), i = j.
While the formalization thus far expresses comparisons of well-being
levels, we should also keep in view comparisons of well-being differences.
Consider the set H × H, comprised of all pairs of histories. Then DIFF
is a quasiordering on H × H.7 ‘((x; i), (y; j))DIFF ((z; l), (w; m))’ should be
interpreted as: the difference between the well-being of individual i in x
and the well-being of individual j in y is at least as large as the difference
between the well-being of individual l in z and individual m in w. DIFF
makes some interpersonal difference comparisons iff there is at least one
case in which ((x; i), (y; j))DIFF ((z; l), (w; m)) and it is not the case that i =
j = l = m.
The puzzle of interpersonal comparisons – thus – is to use information
about individual preferences so as to construct a WB that makes
some interpersonal level comparisons and/or a DIFF that makes some
interpersonal difference comparisons.
What is an extended preference? We should distinguish between
the general concept of an extended preference, and particular conceptions
or versions of this general concept. A preference, on the part of some
individual (Raj), is a ranking that connects to Raj’s choices. While
an outcome-preference is a choice-connected ranking of outcomes, an
‘extended preference’ is a choice-connected ranking of individual histories.
Generically, I will use the term ‘spectator’ to refer to the holder of an
extended preference, and the term ‘subject’ to refer to the individuals in
histories. Phil and Jim are the ‘subjects’, respectively, of the histories (x;
Phil) and (y; Jim). Raj, in holding extended preferences regarding these
histories, is a ‘spectator’.
But what does it mean to rank histories? How are we to analyse the
content of Raj’s preference for (x; Phil) over (y; Jim)? Here, Harsanyi
6
7

See, e.g. Donaldson and Weymark (1998).
In order to conform to truisms about well-being differences, DIFF must also satisfy
additional constraints. See below, Part 6.
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offers a particular conception of extended preferences. Raj is supposed
to imagine ‘standing in Phil’s shoes’ in outcome x. In other words, Raj
is supposed to imagine what it would be like to possess the physical,
social and other attributes that Phil has in outcome x, and also to have
Phil’s tastes. Raj is next supposed to imagine ‘standing in Jim’s shoes’ in
outcome y: possessing now the physical, social, etc. attributes of Jim in
outcome y, along with Jim’s tastes. And, finally, Raj is supposed to rank
(x; Phil) versus (y; Jim) by deciding whether he prefers to have the first
attribute bundle or the second.
As Harsanyi explains:
[T]he basic intellectual operation in . . . interpersonal comparisons is
imaginative empathy. We imagine ourselves to be in the shoes of another
person, and ask ourselves the question, ‘If I were now really in his position,
and had his taste, his education, his social background, his cultural values,
and his psychological makeup, then what would now be my preferences
between various alternatives . . . ? (An ‘alternative’ here stands for a given
bundle of economic commodities plus a given position with respect to
various non-economic variables, such as health, social status, job situation,
family situation, etc.)8
8

Harsanyi (1982: 50). Harsanyi makes similar statements – expressing the standing-in-theshoes or empathy-based conception of extended preferences – at other junctures. For
example:
Our model [of interpersonal comparisons] is based on the assumption that . . . each
individual i will try to assess the utilities Uj (A) that any other individual j would derive
from alternative social situations A and will try to compare these with the utilities Ui (A)
that he himself would derive from these (or from other) social situations. That is, he
will try to make interpersonal utility comparisons. Moreover, we have assumed that i will
attempt to assess these utilities Uj (A) by some process of imaginative empathy, i.e. by
imagining himself to be put in the place of individual j in social situation A.
This must obviously involve his imagining himself to be placed in individual j’s
objective position, i.e. to be placed in the objective conditions (e.g. income, wealth,
consumption level, state of health, social position) that j would face in social situation A.
But it must also involve assessing these objective conditions in terms of j’s own subjective
attitudes and personal preferences . . . (Harsanyi 1977: 51–52)
A few paragraphs later, discussing i’s comparison between the extended alternatives [Ai ,
Pi ] and [Bj , Pj ], with Ai and Bj the objective positions of the two individuals and Pi and
Pj their subjective attitudes, Harsanyi explains: ‘[This comparison] will really amount to
[i] trying to decide whether he himself would prefer to be in the objective position Ai with
his own subjective attitudes Pi , or rather to be in the objective position Bj with j’s subjective
attitudes Pj . . . .’ Id. at 52. And again, further down: ‘[Extended preferences] are preferences
between partly imaginary alternatives [by allowing for a change of tastes], for example,
between eating meat with one’s actual taste and eating fish with a taste quite different
from one’s actual taste’. Id. at 53. Thus the holder of the extended preference imagines his
eating meat or fish and his having certain tastes.
Harsanyi also repeatedly expresses his equiprobability model of moral judgements in
terms of preferences with respect to being ‘put in the place’ of different individuals. See
Harsanyi (1953: 435; 1955: 316; 1977: 50).
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For short, I will term the particular conception of extended preferences
which Harsanyi adopts the empathy-based conception, and I will express
it as follows.
The Empathy-Based Conception of Extended Preferences
As above, O is the set of outcomes, N a finite set of individuals
(each of whom exists in all outcomes), and H = O × N the set of
all histories {(x; i)}. Let K be the set of spectators. For simplicity,
assume that K = N; each individual is both the subject of histories,
and someone who develops extended preferences over histories.
The outcomes in O are arbitrarily detailed specifications of
possible worlds, but do not specify individuals’ preferences. Let
R = (R1 , R2 , . . . , RN ) be a possible profile of outcome and choice
preferences on the part of individuals 1, 2 . . . , N. I will refer to Ri as
the ‘tastes’ of individual i. (This is done purely for terminological
convenience, and does not imply a position about the content or
rational grounding of i’s outcome and choice preferences.)9
For any given R, each spectator k has extended preferences over
H. Denote these extended preferences as k (R), with ‘(R)’ indicating
that the spectator’s extended preferences depend upon the profile of

9

It is important not to conflate outcome and choice preferences, on the one hand, with
extended preferences; and the term ‘taste’ is less clumsy than ‘outcome and choice
preferences’. Sometimes the word ‘taste’ is used to denote a particular kind of outcome
or choice preference, e.g. one that is arbitrary and cannot be given any substantive
justification; but that is not my intention here.
Why define outcomes to exclude tastes? The framework outlined in Part 5 for
aggregating extended preferences is a ‘multiprofile’ framework, whereby different possible
profiles of extended preferences are mapped onto different well-being quasiorderings of
a single history set associated with a single outcome set. Because there are systematic
connections between extended preferences and individual tastes, it must also be possible
(if this multiprofile approach is adopted) to have different profiles of tastes associated with
the very same outcome set. Thus outcomes cannot include tastes.
The general set-up put forth here is somewhat different from Harsanyi’s. Among other
things, it allows for the possibility that well-being-relevant attributes include individuals’
essential attributes (see below Part 3.1), since these may be included in the description of
the various outcomes; while Harsanyi stipulates at the outset that the attributes over which
individuals have extended preferences are attributes each person could have (Harsanyi
1977: 53). However, the central feature of the set-up (that spectators have extended
preferences over hybrid bundles, consisting of both non-taste attributes and tastes) is
exactly what Harsanyi proposes.
Each Ri might be quite complex, since a particular individual might have different
rankings of outcomes depending upon his attitude. In particular, his moral ranking of
outcomes will differ from his self-interested ranking. See below Part 3.2. An individual’s
ranking of choices reflects not only his outcome ranking, but his risk aversion. For
Harsanyi, at least, it is critical that Ri include such information.
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tastes. (To avoid clutter, however, ‘(R)’ will generally be dropped in
my presentation and ‘k ’ used to indicate k (R).)
Formally, k is a quasiordering of H.10 Substantively, k develops k
via empathetic projection. Let Ai (x) denote the (non-taste) attributes
of individual i in outcome x. Let (Ai (x), Ri ) denote a hybrid attribute
bundle, consisting of both the attributes of individual i in outcome
x, and tastes Ri . Then (x; i)k (y; j) iff k weakly prefers to have as
his own attributes the attributes in the hybrid bundle (Ai (x), Ri ), as
compared to having as his own attributes the attributes in the hybrid
bundle (Aj (y), Rj ).
‘Empathy’ – a word that Harsanyi himself uses – is the capacity to
assume someone else’s perspective. On the ‘empathy’ based conception,
the spectator develops extended preferences by exercising this capacity.
In order to compare two histories, the spectator empathetically projects
herself into the position of the first subject (considering both that
subject’s non-taste attributes in the first history, and his tastes), and then
empathetically projects herself into the position of the second subject
(considering now that subject’s non-taste attributes in the second history,
and his tastes). This empathetic projection by the spectator is nothing
other than the thought exercise of taking on the properties (including the
feelings and tastes) of each subject. Thus the ‘empathy-based’ conception
of extended preferences might also be termed an ‘attribute-acquisition’
conception.
Having articulated a conception of extended preferences, Harsanyi
proceeds to arrive at interpersonal comparisons of well-being levels and
differences by making two further assumptions. For short, call these the
‘Convergence’ premise and the ‘Bernoulli’ premise. The Convergence
premise is that spectators have the very same extended preferences. If Raj
prefers (x; Phil) to (y; Jim), then so does Sally. The ‘Bernoulli’ premise is
that spectators’ extended preferences over history lotteries comply with
the requirements of von-Neumann Morgenstern (vNM) expected utility
theory, hence can be expectationally represented by vNM utility functions;
and that a measure of well-being differences is derivable (in a linear
fashion) from these utility functions.
The Convergence and Bernoulli premises, together, allow Harsanyi
to define WB and DIFF as follows. Let v(.) be a vNM function
expectationally representing the spectators’ common extended preferences over history lotteries. Then (x; i)WB (y; j) iff v(x; i) v(y; j). ((x; i),
(y; j)) DIFF ((z; l), (w; m)) iff v(x; i) − v(y; j)  v(z; l) − v(w; m).

10

While Harsanyi assumed a complete ordering, I will generalize and allow for k to be
incomplete.
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The critical literature on Harsanyi has discussed the Convergence
and Bernoulli premises at length.11 The first seems untrue. There is no
particular reason to believe that individuals will have identical extended
preferences. Harsanyi offers an argument for Convergence, but the
argument is flawed.
The Bernoulli premise remains open to reasonable debate, but is
much more contestable than Harsanyi realized. Consider the simplest
case, where Convergence happens to hold true and spectators do have
identical extended preferences over histories and lotteries. Thus there is
a common extended vNM utility function v(.). Why should it be true that
((x; i), (y; j))DIFF ((z; l), (w; m)) iff v(x; i) − v(y; j)  v(z; l) − v(w; m)? Isn’t it
possible that spectators, in ranking lotteries, are risk-averse or risk-prone
in well-being – in other words, that DIFF corresponds to differences in
some convex or concave transformation of v(.)?
These criticisms of Harsanyi are familiar from the literature. In the
next Part, I present a different and more novel criticism.12 This criticism
is logically independent of the familiar critiques of Convergence and
Bernoulli. And, in a sense, the criticism is deeper. I argue that Harsanyi’s
account of the content of extended preferences – the empathy-based
conception – is problematic. In effect, Harsanyi stumbles from the get-go.
An extended preference is some kind of preference or judgement on the
part of the spectator; but to characterize it, specifically, as a preference
to acquire subjects’ attributes and tastes faces serious difficulties. The
critique of the empathy-based conception of extended preferences, which
I develop in this paper, would also apply to a neo-Harsanyi view
that relaxes Convergence and/or Bernoulli but retains the problematic
analysis of extended preferences in terms of empathetic projection.
3. THE EMPATHY-BASED CONCEPTION OF EXTENDED PREFERENCES:
A CRITIQUE
This Part describes two important flaws in the empathy-based conception
of extended preferences – flaws that have received little attention in the
literature. More precisely, these are flaws in any account of well-being

11

12

On Convergence, see, e.g. Broome (1998); Mongin (2001). On Bernoulli, see Sen (1976, 1986:
1122–1123); Weymark (1991, 2005); Broome (1995); Mongin and d’Aspremont (1998); Risse
(2002); Roemer (2008); Fleurbaey and Mongin (2012). The term ‘Bernoulli’ to mean the
derivation of a measure of well-being differences from lottery preferences is taken from
Broome.
The empathy/sympathy distinction is brought to light, with reference to Harsanyi’s work,
by Mongin (2001), and more generally with reference to economic theory by Fontaine
(1997). However, much of the critical analysis presented in Part 3 of this paper, as well as
the positive proposal in Part 4, is – I believe – novel.
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comparisons (such as Harsanyi’s) that builds from this conception.13 The
first flaw is the ‘essential attribute’ problem; the second, the ‘wrong kind
of preference’ problem.
3.1. The Essential-Attribute Problem
Recall that, on the empathy-based conception, the spectator k is asked
to compare (x; i) and (y; j) by comparing the state of affairs in which
he possesses attribute bundle (Ai (x), Ri ), to the state of affairs in which
he possess (Aj (y), Rj ). Consider, now, that there are attributes which the
spectator essentially possesses, and also attributes that he essentially
lacks.14 For short, call the latter ELk properties. ELk properties are
properties that k cannot possibly possess – properties that k does not have
in any possible world where he exists.
The essential-attribute problem is this: if Ai (x), or Aj (y), or both include
ELk attributes, the empathy-based conception asks k to compare impossible
states of affairs.15
For example, imagine that the spectator is a woman, Sue Dean,
currently living and born in 1980. Sue is told about a possible life
that Cleopatra might have led, (x; Cleopatra), and a possible life that
Shakespeare might have led, (y; Shakespeare). She is also told that
Cleopatra had tastes RCleopatra , and that Shakespeare had tastes RShakespeare.
Sue is then asked to formulate her extended preferences between
the two lives. In x, Cleopatra is described as having various (non-taste)
attributes: she was born in the first century BC; she was female; she was
beautiful, rich and powerful; she was the last ruler of the Ptolemaic
Dynasty of Egypt; she had affairs with Julius Caesar and Marc Antony;
she was deposed and imprisoned for life by the Romans after Octavian
defeated Antony at the battle of Actium.16 In y, Shakespeare’s attributes
include: he was born in the 16th century AD; he was male; he was ugly and,
13
14

15

16

I take no position about the role of empathy-based extended preferences except as a basis
for constructing WB and DIFF .
For a general discussion of essential properties, see Lowe (2002: ch. 6); Mackie (2006);
Roca-Royes (2011). Characterizing the essential properties of persons is one aspect of the
vast literature on personal identity. See sources cited in Adler (2012: 409).
Since tastes are simply rankings of outcomes or choices, it is hard to see how the attribute
of having Ri or Rj could be impossible for k. Someone’s essential attributes might be
something like her DNA, or the circumstances of her birth, but not her preferences. I
thus focus on the possibility that some of the non-taste attributes in Ai (x), or Aj (y), or
both include ELk attributes. Including taste attributes as essential simply compounds
the difficulties for the empathy approach. (Perhaps a certain variant of Psychological
Essentialism, see below, would count some taste attributes as essential.)
Remember that x is a possible outcome, not necessarily actual. Although Cleopatra in fact
died at her own hand after Antony’s defeat, a life in which the Romans imprison her is
also possible.
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although respected as a playwright in his own time, not famous until after
his death; he struggled financially; he was married to Anne Hathaway, a
loyal and loving wife, for his entire adult life; he wrote some of the greatest
plays ever written, including Hamlet, Macbeth and King Lear.
On the empathy-based conception, the spectator, Sue Dean, is meant
to rank these two histories by determining her preference as between the
following two states of affairs: (1) Sue Dean is born in the first century BC;
is female, beautiful, rich and powerful; is the last ruler of the Ptolemaic
Dynasty; has affairs with Julius Caesar and Marc Antony; is deposed and
imprisoned for life by the Romans after the battle of Actium; and has tastes
RCleopatra ; (2) Sue Dean is born in the 16th century AD; is an ugly male
playwright, respected but not famous, who struggles financially but is
happily married to Anne Hathaway; writes great plays including Hamlet,
Macbeth and King Lear; and has tastes RShakespeare .
Neither state of affairs (1) nor (2) seems possible. To be sure, Sue
Dean’s gender, physical appearance, occupation, political power, social
and financial status, and whether she marries or has intimate affiliations
are contingent properties of her. So it is possible for Sue Dean to have been
male or female, ugly or beautiful, a playwright or a monarch, imprisoned
or free, rich or poor, married or not. But Sue Dean necessarily was born in
1980 or thereabouts, and thus necessarily was not born in the first century
BC, or in the 16th century AD. Plausibly, the precise or at least rough timing
of someone’s birth is one of her essential properties.17
Moreover (on the premise that birth timing is an essential property),
it is not possible for Sue Dean to have been a pharaoh of the Ptolemaic
Dynasty (a particular kingdom that lasted from the 4th to the 1st centuries
BC); nor to have written Hamlet, Macbeth or King Lear (plays that were
written at the beginning of the 17th century AD); nor to have been the
lover of Julius Caesar or Marc Antony, nor the spouse of Anne Hathaway
(particular individuals all of whom died centuries or millennia before Sue
Dean’s birth date of 1980).
One might deny that birth timing is an essential property – but
this hardly meets the challenge. Which properties are essential to human
persons is a matter of philosophical dispute; but surely some are. Consider,
then, any case in which i in x has some ELk property. Then for k to formulate an extended preference as between (x; i) and some other history –
on the empathy account – involves k’s preferring an impossible state of
affairs.
I now consider three strategies the proponent of the empathy account
might use to address the essential-attribute problem.
(1) The Severance Strategy. The spectator k might be instructed to
compare a given pair of histories (x; i) and (y; j) by comparing a state of
17

See Mackie (2006: ch. 6).
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affairs in which k has all the properties of i in x except the ELk properties of
i in x, plus tastes Ri , to a state of affairs in which k has all the properties
of j in y except the ELk properties of j in y, plus tastes Rj . This means that
Sue Dean compares (x; Cleopatra) to (y; Shakespeare) by considering a
state of affairs in which Sue Dean has all the attributes of Cleopatra in
x except those that Sue Dean necessarily lacks, and a state of affairs in
which she has all the attributes of Shakespeare in y except those that
Sue necessarily lacks. On the premise that someone’s birth date is an
essential property of her, the first state of affairs would be something
like the following: Sue Dean is female, beautiful, rich, and powerful; she
is the monarch of a kingdom located on the Nile River; she has affairs
in succession with two men, each leading figures in a country with its
capital at Rome; after the second lover dies, she is imprisoned for life. The
second state of affairs would be something like: Sue Dean is an ugly male
playwright married to a loyal and loving wife, who writes plays just as
good as Hamlet, Macbeth and King Lear (but at a point in historical time
when Sue Dean, born in 1980, could have written such plays).
The severance strategy is problematic. Nothing in the concept of wellbeing would seem to preclude certain individual attributes from playing
a role in determining the welfare of some subject, merely because those
attributes are essential (in any sense, either essentially possessed by the
subject, or essentially lacked by some spectator). Well-being, conceptually,
involves subject-relative goodness: if Shakespeare in y is better off than
Cleopatra in x, then y is better for Shakespeare than x is for Cleopatra. This
goodness-for relation will be grounded in Shakespeare’s and Cleopatra’s
attributes – and, if so, why not (in part) their essential attributes, even if
these might be essentially lacked by some spectators? Why should we rule
out this possibility ab initio?
Perhaps the irrelevance of essential attributes to well-being is a
metaphysical rather than conceptual fact – as in the famous example of the
metaphysical but not conceptual necessity that water is H2 O. Metaphysical necessities emerge (paradigmatically) by empirical investigation. We
learn by scientific investigation that the molecular makeup of the wet and
thirst-quenching stuff we call ‘water’ is H2 O. Similarly, perhaps, we have
learned by ‘empirical’ investigation – scholarly research into the content
of individual preferences, philosophical deliberation about well-being via
concrete thought experiments – that an individual’s well-being depends
upon her contingent, not essential attributes.
But have we learned this? I am dubious. Which properties of human
persons are essential, and which are contingent, is itself a matter of heated
and continuing dispute. Because we haven’t settled this debate (either
conceptually or empirically), it also seems far from clear that essential
attributes are – in fact – irrelevant to well-being. For example, it remains
far from clear whether or not (some of) a particular person’s psychological
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attributes are (some of) her essential properties. Perhaps it is impossible
for Sue Dean to have had a radically different series of perceptions,
memories and experiences (‘psychological history’) than those of the
actual Sue Dean. Call this Psychological Essentialism.18 If Psychological
Essentialism is true, the severance strategy clearly fails. Consider asking
Sue Dean to compare (x∗ ; Cleopatra) and (y∗ ; Shakespeare). Outcomes x∗
and y∗ are the same as x and y above, respectively, but supplemented with
rich detail about Cleopatra’s and Shakespeare’s psychological histories. x+
and y+ are outcomes in which Sue has the contingent non-psychological
attributes of Cleopatra and Shakespeare in x∗ and y∗ , respectively, and the
psychological attributes of theirs which Sue Dean can possibly possess
(given Psychological Essentialism). If many of Sue Dean’s psychological
attributes in x+ and y+ are different from Cleopatra’s and Shakespeare’s
in x∗ and y∗ , then Sue’s preference as between x+ and y+ doesn’t tell us
much at all about how (x∗ ; Cleopatra) and (y∗ ; Shakespeare) compare in
terms of well-being.
Finally, even if it is true (as an empirical rather than conceptual feature
of well-being) that well-being depends solely on individuals’ contingent
properties, the severance strategy is problematic. Remember that this
strategy asks the spectator k to compare (x; i) and (y; j) by comparing a
state of affairs in which k has all of the properties of i in x except the
ELk properties, plus tastes Ri , to a state of affairs in which k has all of
the properties of j in y except the ELk properties, plus tastes Rj . Many
of the subjects’ properties in these outcomes might be properties which
the spectator could have, but which the spectator finds it very difficult
to imagine having. For example, someone’s gender, unlike his or her
DNA, is very plausibly a contingent attribute, since dependent on social
construction and macroscopic physical features; but many individuals,
still, find it difficult to imagine changing their gender. Thus, in the
Shakespeare/Cleopatra case, Sue Dean may hardly be able to imagine the
state of affairs in which she has Shakespeare’s occupation, income level,
etc., and in which she is male (Shakespeare’s gender) – even though none
of these are ELSue Dean attributes. Why does this matter? Presumably the
extended preferences relevant to well-being satisfy standard idealizing
conditions; these are the preferences that emerge and remain stable after
deliberation with good information. If Sue can barely imagine one or
both states of affairs that the severance strategy asks her to consider in
comparing (x; Cleopatra) and (y; Shakespeare) – the state in which she
has all of Cleopatra’s properties except the ELSue Dean properties, and the
state in which she has all of Shakespeare’s properties except the ELsue Dean
18

Psychological Essentialism would be a plausible consequence of the view that each
particular person is a particular psychological entity, rather than a particular human being
(‘animalism’). See Brown (2003).
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properties – then she can hardly form a stable preference between these
states.19
(2) The De Se Strategy. Philosophers of language and mind distinguish
between ‘de se’ and ‘de re’ beliefs, which can come apart under conditions
of imperfect self-knowledge. De se beliefs are expressed by sentences with
‘I’ in the subject position; de re beliefs, by sentences with the proper name
of some person in the subject position.20
Imagine that John Perry wakes up in the middle of the night in
a dark room, after an operation that has temporarily caused amnesia.
He is bewildered, having forgotten everything about his life before the
operation. He sees a TV in the corner of the room. At that moment, John
Perry has the de se beliefs, ‘I am seeing a TV’ and ‘I am in a dark room’,
but not the de re beliefs ‘John Perry is seeing a TV’ or ‘John Perry is in a
dark room’. Although John Perry is aware of himself saying or thinking
the word ‘I’, he does not have the de re beliefs just mentioned because –
by virtue of his amnesia – John Perry does not realize that the particular
person who is the referent for the word ‘I’ is the very same person who is
the referent for the proper name ‘John Perry’.
Related to a distinction between de se and de re beliefs is a distinction
between de se and de re imagining.21 It is impossible for John Perry (the
20th century philosopher) to be the very same person as the historical
figure Napoleon Bonaparte. And it is presumably difficult for John Perry,
or anyone else, even to imagine the state of affairs that ‘John Perry
is Napoleon Bonaparte’. But John Perry may find it relatively easy to
imagine the de se proposition, ‘I am Napoleon Bonaparte’.

19

20
21

Mongin (2001) is sensitive to the difficulties regarding personal identity that arise in
asking the spectator to assume the subject’s standpoint. See, e.g. 2001: 161–162. He
proposes to avoid those difficulties via the following construal of extended preferences:
spectator k has an extended preference for (x; i) over (y; j) just in case k prefers that
outcome x obtain and that k be ‘under the influence of the factors determining [i]’s
preferences’, rather than that outcome y obtain and that k be under the influence of the
factors determining j’s preferences (2001: 160).
On the supposition that an individual’s preferences, and the factors determining them,
are not essential attributes of hers (see 2001: 156–157), Mongin’s proposal is a version
of the severance strategy. An objection to this proposal is that the well-being relevance
of a given contingent attribute should not hinge on whether the attribute is preferencedetermining. For example, assume that there is some mild health impairment which
has no causal influence on individuals’ preferences. (Individuals prefer not to have the
impairment; but having it does not change how individuals rank health states, healthincome bundles, etc.). Then, on Mongin’s proposal, k should ignore whether i or j has
the impairment in determining his extended preferences as between (x; i) and (y; j). That
seems arbitrary, if extended preferences are meant to provide an analysis of well-being.
See, e.g. Lewis (1979), Perry (1979), Recanati (2007), Feit (2008).
See Williams (1973: ch. 3), Vendler (1976), Reynolds (1989); Walton (1990: 28–35), Gordon
(1995), Velleman (1996), Nichols (2008), Ninan (2009).
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Why this difference? The relative ease of de se versus de re imagining
is a matter of ongoing discussion. Various philosophers have suggested
that a de se imagining occurs when someone, perhaps with accurate beliefs
about his actual attributes, engages in an act of ‘pretense’ or ‘make believe’
that shifts the ‘I’ concept so that it refers to someone else.
Many actors speak of transforming themselves, of becoming the characters
they play. This typically involves an imaginative shift in the reference of
indexicals. There is a character in the dramatis personae who becomes in
your imagination the referent of the pronoun ‘I’, and his time and place
become the referents of ‘now’ and ‘here’. One very perceptive actor, Ray
McAnally . . . describes his thoughts while filming a scene in which he
plays a future British prime minister: ‘I had a very interesting moment in 10
Downing Street, surrounded by pictures of all the previous Prime Ministers
and me in the middle of it. And I realized it was true, I was the Prime Minister
. . . ’ Of course he is in fact pretending to be the prime minister, only he
is doing it so well that he is oblivious to that fact. (By the way, he is not
pretending that the following counteridentical is true: ‘Ray McAnally is the
prime minister’. Analogously, although I may pretend on July first that ‘It is
now New Year’s Eve’, I am not pretending that July first is New Year’s Eve.)
...
The imaginative shift in the reference of indexicals reflects a much deeper,
more important shift. Many of our tendencies to action or emotion appear to
be specially keyed to an egocentric map. What triggers the action or emotion
is the lion coming toward me, the meeting I am supposed to be at now, the
insult directed to me, the award given to my child. . . .
What the actor can do is to recenter his egocentric map. Think of one of those
transparent overlays on a map, with concentric circles showing the distance
from any point you center it on. The actor can shift his egocentric overlay
until it is centered on a particular character, place, and time, rather than on,
say, Ray McAnally and his place and time.22

With the de re/de se distinction in hand, one might try to specify the
empathy-based account of extended preferences in de se fashion, so as
to avoid the essential-attribute problem. In comparing (x; i) and (y; j),
the spectator k is not meant to compare the state of affairs in which the
particular person referred to by the proper name of k has all the attributes
of i in x, to the state of affairs in which that particular person has all
the attributes of j in y. Rather, k is meant to consider her preference as
between scenarios specified with ‘I’, namely ‘I have all the attributes of
person i in outcome x’ versus ‘I have all the attributes of person j in
outcome y’. For example, in the Shakespeare/Cleopatra case, Sue Dean
is not meant to wrap her head around the impossibility, ‘Sue Dean is born
22

Gordon (1995: 733–734). For similar views, see Velleman (1996), Nichols (2008).
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in the first century BC, Sue Dean is a Ptolemaic queen, lover of Antony
and Julius Caesar’, etc., but rather to think of the history (x; Cleopatra) by
entertaining a de se scenario in which ‘I am born in the first century BC, I am
a Ptolematic queen, I am the lover of Antony and Caesar’, etc. Similarly,
Sue Dean is meant to think of the history (y; Shakespeare) by entertaining
a de se scenario in which ‘I am born in the 16th century, I am married to
Anne Hathaway, I write Hamlet, King Lear and Macbeth’, etc.
But if Sue Dean knows who she is (born in 1980, etc.), then she
can only see the de se scenarios corresponding to (x; Cleopatra) and (y;
Shakespeare) as fictions – pretence, make-believe, acts of imagination. It is
hard to see why a spectator’s preferences regarding fictions corresponding
in some way to genuine possible lives have much to tell us about the
well-being associated with those lives. In general, someone’s ordinary
preferences regarding some outcome might be quite different from what
she prefers if the outcome is taken as fiction. For example, Sue Dean might
prefer the outcome in which Sue Dean lives a contented but uneventful life
as a married accountant, dying at the age of 80, to one in which Sue Dean
becomes a drug addict who loses her job, destroys her marriage, becomes
homeless, and is killed at age 50 in a violent street encounter at just the
point where she has resolved to beat her addiction. But Sue might prefer
the latter scenario, taken as fiction, because of its dramatic interest.23
Alternatively, the empathy-based conception might ask for the
spectator to be placed under a kind of ‘veil of ignorance’ about her own
attributes, as in the example of the amnesiac John Perry earlier. Spectator k
is deprived of information about her name, place of birth, etc. Under that
condition, she is asked to develop a preference as between (x; i) and (y; j)
by considering, first, the outcome in which ‘I have all the attributes of i
in x’ and second, the outcome in which ‘I have all the attributes of j in y’.
Because the spectator does not know the referent for ‘I’, she can entertain
these outcomes as real possibilities, not fictional scenarios.
But this veil-of-ignorance construal of the empathy conception is in
serious tension with the truism that well-being-relevant preferences must
satisfy various idealizing conditions, including good information. Such
information includes not merely information about the outcomes being
considered, but also self-knowledge on the part of the preference-holder,
for example about whether her preferences were the result of parental
indoctrination, adaptation to adverse circumstances, etc.24 By depriving
Sue Dean of facts about her birth date (and other autobiographical data)
when she considers ‘I am born in the 1st century BC, I am a queen of the
23

24

Some philosophers have responded to the various differences between ordinary desires,
and desires about fictional scenarios, by arguing that the latter are not really desires at all.
(For a critical overview, see Kind 2011). In any event, the differences are substantial.
See Brandt (1998).
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Ptolemies, . . . ’, we allow her to think of these scenarios as real possibilities
(not fictions), but also thereby suction away some of the crucial data that
Sue would need for her preferences to be well-informed.25
The term ‘veil-of-ignorance’ is sometimes used to denote any
construction that translates outcomes into the bundles of histories therein,
and appeals to spectators’ preferences (extended preferences) over these
histories for some normative purpose, e.g. to determine what justice
requires. My objection here is not to the veil-of-ignorance in this
generic sense, but much more specifically to the proposal that extended
preferences involve a condition of ignorance on the spectator about who
she is.
(3) The Psychological Strategy. Perhaps in comparing (x; i) and (y; j), the
spectator is meant to compare the experience of being the subjects in the two
outcomes. In other words, the spectator is not supposed to consider the
acquisition of non-mental attributes, such as Cleopatra’s or Shakespeare’s
birth dates or their having lovers or spouses with particular identities,
but instead to compare having all of the non-taste psychological attributes
(feelings, perceptions, beliefs, emotions) of i in x, plus tastes Ri , to having
all of the non-taste psychological attributes of j in y, plus tastes Rj .
However, as already noted, asking the spectator to consider a state
of affairs in which she has psychological attributes different from her
own might be asking her to consider an impossible state of affairs – if
Psychological Essentialism is true. A quite different problem is this: a
subject’s psychological attributes are not the sole, intrinsic determinants
of her well-being. Non-experiential attributes also matter, as vividly
illustrated by Robert Nozick’s ‘experience machine’.26 (y; Shakespeare)
is much better for well-being than (y++ ; Fakespeare), with Fakespeare
in y++ someone who has the very same experiences as Shakespeare in
y (including the very same beliefs about the artistic quality of his plays),
but with the histories differentiated by the fact that Shakespeare actually
produces great art while Fakespeare’s plays are junk.
3.2. The ‘Wrong Kind of Preference’ Problem
In Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit notes that the occurrence of one
outcome rather than a second may make no difference to someone’s wellbeing, even though the person prefers the first outcome, and even though
this preference satisfies normal idealizing conditions (good information,
rationality, deliberation). Parfit illustrates the problem with the following
example, the ‘stranger’ case:
25
26

See also Voorhoeve (2014), pointing to difficulties that may arise for the veil-of-ignorance
approach if some essential attributes are psychological attributes.
Nozick (1974: 42–44)
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Suppose that I meet a stranger who has what is believed to be a fatal disease.
My sympathy is aroused, and I strongly want this stranger to be cured.
We never meet again. Later, unknown to me, this stranger is cured. On
the [actual preference theory of well-being], this event is good for me, and
makes my life go better. This is not plausible. We should reject this theory.27

Note that Parfit, in this story, supposes himself to have a preference the
content of which is (1) ‘that the stranger be cured’, and not a preference
with the content (2) ‘that the stranger be cured and I experience happiness
at his being cured’, or (3) ‘that I believe the stranger to be cured’. Parfit, if
motivated by a benevolent concern for the stranger, could easily develop a
well-informed preference with the content of (1); such a preference would
be fulfilled by the sheer fact of the stranger’s being cured, whether or not
Parfit learns about that fact, or feels good about it; but the sheer fact of the
stranger’s being cured does not, without more, improve Parfit’s own wellbeing. This is the point of the example.28
Many other philosophers concur with Parfit. The ‘stranger’ case has
been widely discussed in the contemporary philosophical literature on
well-being, and the lesson it suggests has become virtually a truism in
that literature. For example, Stephen Darwall writes:
There are many things I rationally take an interest in, such as the survival of
the planet and the happiness of my children long after I am dead, that will
make no contribution to my welfare. A person may have rational interests
that go well beyond what is for her good or in her interest. A person’s good –
what benefits her or advances her welfare – is different from what is good
from her point of view or standpoint. The latter is the perspective of what
she herself cares about, whereas her own good is what is desirable from the
perspective of someone (perhaps she herself) who cares for her.29

27
28

29

Parfit (1987: 494).
An anonymous referee has suggested that the preference-based view of well-being can be
rescued from Parfit’s objection by analysing well-being as the combination of preferencerealization plus the knowledge thereof. However, if my preference is morally motivated,
it is hard to see why the preference’s realization plus my justified true belief in this
occurrence benefits me (without more). Perhaps this shows that the knowledge condition
needs to be strengthened to enjoyment or happiness. However, there will be plausible
cases in which the realization of my preference (for example, a preference for success at
long-standing goals, for the flourishing of my children, for the fidelity of my spouse, or
for the respect of my peers) can benefit me even though I never feel happiness about the
fact that the preference has been realized – indeed, arguably, even if I never learn of that
fact.
For a discussion of the possible restrictions on preferences to ensure their well-being
relevance, see Adler (2012: 174–181). However Parfit’s example is handled, it shows the
need for some such restriction.
Darwall (2002: 53).
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Tim Scanlon writes:
[Desire theories of well-being are] open to serious objection. The most
general view of this kind – it might be called the unrestricted actual-desire
theory – holds that a person’s well-being is measured by the degree to which
all the person’s actual desires are satisfied. Since one can have a desire about
almost anything, this makes an implausibly broad range of considerations
count as determinants of a person’s well-being. Someone might have a
desire about the chemical composition of some star, about whether blue was
Napoleon’s favorite color, or about whether Julius Caesar was an honest
man. But it would be odd to suggest that the well-being of a person who has
such desires is affected by these facts themselves (as opposed to the pleasure
he or she derives from having certain beliefs about them). The fact that some
distant star is made up of the elements I would like it to be does not seem
to make my life better (assuming that I am not an astronomer whose life
work has been devoted to a theory that would be confirmed or refuted by
this fact).30

Richard Arneson writes: ‘[N]ot all of an agent’s desires plausibly bear on
her well-being. I might listen to a televised plea for famine relief, and form
the desire to aid distant starving strangers, without myself thinking (and
without its being plausible for anyone else to think) that the fulfilment of
this desire would in any way make my life go better’.31
I will term the problem described by Parfit et al. the ‘wrong kind of
preference’ problem. As already explained, an outcome-preference is a
ranking of outcomes, on the part of some person, that constitutes a choicedisposition on his part: what choices the preference-holder is disposed
to make depends upon where their possible outcomes are located in
this ranking. However, nothing in the sheer existence of this disposition
guarantees that the choice-motivating features of outcomes are connected
to the preference-holder’s well-being. If someone has a preference for
outcome x over outcome y (perhaps a fully informed, rational, and stable
preference) but this is the ‘wrong kind of preference’, he need not be better
off in x than y.
Moral preferences provide a particularly clear illustration of the
problem. Jim might judge that x is morally better than y, and come to
prefer x, even though his own interests favour y. But the problem is more
general. Jim might be motivated to pursue x in virtue of considerations
that are neither moral, nor connected to his interests (for example,
aesthetic considerations, or perceived compliance with the will of God).

30
31

Scanlon (1998: 113–114).
Arneson (1999: 124). See also Overvold (1980, 1982, 1984), Gibbard (1986), Griffin (1986:
chs. 1–2), Kagan (1992), Sumner (1996: ch. 5), Bernstein (1998); Brandt (1998: ch. 17);
Hausman and McPherson (2009).

http://journals.cambridge.org

Downloaded: 02 Jul 2015

IP address: 152.3.34.48

142

M ATTHEW D. A DLER

The ‘wrong kind of preference’ problem clearly undermines an
analysis of intrapersonal well-being comparisons in terms of unrestricted
outcome-preferences. But it also – less obviously – undermines the
proposal to analyse intrapersonal or interpersonal comparisons in terms
of extended preferences in the empathy-based sense.
Why? Let us ignore, for the moment, the essential-attribute problem
and assume that spectator k can engage in the thought exercise of
acquiring all of the attributes of various subjects. In ranking (x; i) versus
(y; j), the spectator is asking whether she would prefer to have an attribute
bundle (Ai (x), Ri ) consisting of individual i’s attributes in x, plus tastes Ri ,
as against a bundle (Aj (y), Rj ) consisting of individual j’s attributes in y,
plus tastes Rj . Since these two bundles consist of the subjects’ attributes
(both non-taste attributes and tastes), how can the spectator’s preference
between the two diverge from the subjects’ well-being?
Note, to begin, that a given subject’s attributes include her relational
as well as non-relational attributes. Thus other subjects’ attributes are ‘built
into’ the bundle of a given subject, as relational attributes of hers. But,
clearly, spectators can have non-self-interested preferences for attribute
bundles of this sort that don’t track the well-being associated with the
bundles.
To see this in a simple case, imagine that there are five people in
the population: i, j, k, l, m. Outcome x is one in which individuals’
incomes range in $20 000 increments from $20 000 to $100 000. Individual
i has income $20 000, and individual j has income $100 000; while the
other three have, respectively, incomes of $40 000, $60 000 and $80 000.
Individual i has tastes Ri , etc.
Then (Ai (x), Ri ) is the bundle (having an income of $20 000; having
tastes Ri ; being part of a population of five individuals where the
other incomes are $40 000, $60 000, $80 000, $100 000 and where the other
individuals have tastes Rk , Rl , Rm and Rj ).32 And (Aj (x), Rj ) is the bundle
(having an income of $100 000; having tastes Rj ; being part of a population
of five individuals where the other incomes are $20 000, $40 000, $60 000,
$80 000 and where the other tastes are Ri , Rk , Rl and Rm ).
Imagine, now, that k is an impartial spectator. In the exercise of ranking
hybrid bundles, she assumes an attitude, not of self-interest, but rather
of impartiality between her interests and everyone else’s. If so k will be
indifferent between the bundles (Ai (x), Ri ) and (Aj (x), Rj ). She doesn’t care,
from this impartial perspective, whether she is the one with $20 000 and
particular tastes in a given population distribution of income and tastes,
or she is the one with $100 000 and particular tastes in the very same
32

Although the bundle (Ai (x), Ri ) does not itself describe the tastes of the other subjects, that
information is part of the profile of tastes, and is available to spectator k in determining
which bundle she prefers.
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distribution of income and tastes. But, of course, (x; i) and (x; j) are not
equally good for well-being. It is worse for well-being, ceteris paribus, to
be the person with the lowest income in a given distribution of income,
rather than the person with the highest (at least if Ri and Rj both include a
taste for more income rather than less).
The ‘wrong kind of preference’ problem can arise even apart from
the inclusion of the population distribution of attributes in each attribute
bundle as a relational attribute of the subject who possesses that bundle.
Consider the following sort of case. Subjects i and j, in outcomes x and
y respectively, both engage in wrongdoing. But only i is punished (by
prolonged incarceration), while j escapes punishment. Thus Ai (x) includes
the attributes of engaging in wrongdoing and being punished, while
Aj (y) includes the attributes of engaging in wrongdoing and escaping
punishment. Let us also suppose that Ri and Rj are tastes of the ordinary
sort, including a moral preference that wrongdoing be punished, and a
self-interested preference not to be incarcerated.
Now, spectator k himself also has a moral preference that wrongdoing
be punished. If motivated by this preference, he ranks (Ai (x), Ri ) over
(Aj (y), Rj ). He has this ranking even though (x; i) may well be worse for
well-being than (y; j), since i suffers the harm of prolonged incarceration.
Spectator k would morally prefer to be (1) a wrongdoer who selfinterestedly prefers not to be incarcerated, but is in fact incarcerated as
punishment for the wrongdoing, as opposed to (2) a wrongdoer who selfinterestedly prefers not to be incarcerated, and escapes punishment.
4. A SYMPATHY-BASED CONCEPTION OF EXTENDED PREFERENCES
I propose a sympathy-based conception of extended preferences.33 The
generic set-up remains the same one I used above, in discussing the
empathy-based conception. O is the set of outcomes, N a finite set of
individuals (each of whom exists in all outcomes), and H = O × N the
set of all histories {(x; i)}. K is the set of spectators (for simplicity, assume
that K = N). The outcomes in O are arbitrarily detailed specifications
of possible worlds, but do not specify individuals’ preferences. Let R =
(R1 , R2 , . . . , RN ) be a possible profile of ‘tastes’ (outcome and choice
preferences) on the part of individuals 1, 2 . . . N. For any given R, each
spectator k has extended preferences k (R) (or, for short, k ). Each k is a
quasiordering of H.
The difference between the sympathy-based and empathy-based
conception of extended preferences lies not in this set-up (which is quite
33

This Part builds upon, and refines, the analysis of Adler (2012: ch. 3). See also Adler
(forthcoming), further developing the approach set forth here, with a fuller treatment of
comparisons of well-being differences.
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general), but in the substantive content of k . In explicating the sympathy
approach, I will distinguish between ‘intrapersonal’ and ‘interpersonal’
extended preferences. A spectator’s extended preference as between two
histories with the same subject is an ‘intrapersonal’ extended preference.
A spectator’s extended preference as between two histories with different
subjects is an ‘interpersonal’ extended preference.
The Sympathy-Based Conception of Extended Preferences
(1) Intrapersonal case: (x; i)k (y; i) iff spectator k, under a condition of
unreserved34 sympathy for subject i, and given the profile of tastes
in R, weakly prefers35 outcome x to outcome y.
(2) Interpersonal case: (x; i)k (y; j), with i and j distinct, iff spectator k
makes the judgement that i in x is at least as well off as j in y, given
the profile of tastes in R.
What exactly is the connection between extended preferences, in the
sympathy-based sense, and WB ? Part 5 will address this question for
the general case, where Convergence may fail. At a minimum, however,
if Convergence holds true (everyone has the same extended preferences,
i.e. 1 = 2 = . . . =  N = ), then the sympathy-based conception says:
(x; i)WB (y; j), the two outcomes and subjects the same or different, iff
(x; i)(y; j).
What is sympathy? While I empathize with you by projecting myself
into your position, I sympathize with you by adopting an attitude of care
and concern for you. Darwall has emphasized the distinction between
empathy and sympathy, and the connection of sympathy (not empathy)
to well-being.
[Sympathy] is a feeling or emotion that (i) responds to some apparent
obstacle to an individual’s welfare, (ii) has that individual himself as object,
and (iii) involves concern for him, and thus for his welfare, for his sake.
Seeing the child on the verge of falling [down the well], one is concerned for
his safety, not just for its (his safety’s) sake, but for his sake. One is concerned
for him. Sympathy for the child is a way of caring for (and about) him.
Sympathy differs in this respect from several distinct psychological
phenomena usually collected under the term ‘empathy’ that may involve
no such concern. What these phenomena have in common is their involving
feelings that are ‘congruent with the other’s emotional state or condition’,
as one psychologist puts it. Here it is the way things seem from the other’s
standpoint that is salient, in this case, the prospect of falling down the well.
34
35

That is, k’s sympathy is wholly directed on i, and no one else.
Since k itself is weak (with ‘strict’ extended preference k and extended indifference k
derived in the standard fashion from k ), it should be defined in terms of a weak outcome
preference.
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Empathy consists in feeling what one imagines he feels, or perhaps should
feel (fear, say), or in some imagined copy of these feelings, whether one
comes thereby to be concerned for the child or not. Empathy can be followed
by the indifference of pure observation or even the cruelty of sadism. It all
depends on why one is interested in the other’s perspective. Sympathy, on
the other hand, is felt, not as from the child’s perspective, but as from the
perspective of ‘one caring’.
...
[T]he concern we experience for people in sympathy is central, not just to
seeing individuals and their well-being as having categorical importance,
but also to the very concept of well-being or personal good. . . . It is because
we can take up the standpoint of one caring toward ourselves and others
and ask what it makes sense to want from that point of view that we have a
need for the concept [of well-being].36

The sympathy-based conception of extended preferences readily avoids
the essential-attribute problem and the wrong-kind-of-preference problem. Consider first the intrapersonal case. In ranking (x; i) and (y; i),
the spectator does not engage in the thought experiment of acquiring
i’s attributes in x and in y. Instead, his extended preference is reduced
to a preference of the ordinary sort – an outcome preference – with an
attitudinal restriction, namely a ranking of those outcomes while in the
grip of an attitude of unreserved sympathy for the subject, i.
The fact that some of the subject’s attributes are ELk attributes in no
way frustrates this exercise. For example, Sue Dean, with an attitude of
concern for Cleopatra, can ask herself whether she prefers the outcome xʹ
in which Cleopatra dies after Actium from a self-imposed snakebite, or
instead the outcome x in which Cleopatra is imprisoned for life by the
Romans. Because xʹ and x are not outcomes in which Sue Dean herself
is supposed to be born in the first century BC, to be the lover of Marc
Antony, etc., the outcomes are possible. And the fact that Sue Dean and
Cleopatra are distinct individuals, each with some essential attributes that
the other lacks, obviously does not prevent Sue from being sympathetic to
Cleopatra. Sympathy often takes the form of being targeted upon some
person distinct from the sympathizer.
The ‘wrong kind of preference problem’, remember, was that the
sheer possession of a preference on someone’s part for x over y does
not guarantee that x is better than y (for the holder of the preference,
or for anyone else), since preferences can be motivated by a wide
range of considerations (moral, aesthetic, etc.). But the sympathy-based
conception avoids this problem, in the intrapersonal case, by virtue
of the connection between sympathy and well-being emphasized by
36

Darwall (2002: 51, 72). See also Fontaine (1997), Darwall (1998), Eisenberg (2000).
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Darwall – more precisely, the connection between having an attitude of
sympathy, and being motivated to pursue what you believe lies in the
interests of the sympathy target. Where spectator k holds an attitude of
unreserved sympathy for subject i, it is necessarily the case that: if k
believes x to be better for i’s well-being than y, k prefers x to y.37
Thus k’s weak preference for x over y, under a condition of unreserved
sympathy with i, is evidence that (x; i)WB (y; i) – at least if k is suitably
‘idealized’ in the sense of having good information, deliberates, etc. And
the fact that all spectators, under a condition of unreserved sympathy
with i, weakly prefer x to y, is substantial evidence that (x; i)WB (y; i), if
the spectators are suitably idealized – indeed, it arguably guarantees that
(x; i)WB (y; i).38
Note that this linkage between the preferences held by spectators
sympathetic to a particular subject, and the subject’s well-being, becomes
much weaker if we relax the requirement that spectators be unreservedly
sympathetic to the subject. Imagine that some well-informed spectators
are equally concerned about everyone in a group of subjects, including
Jim, and under this condition prefer x to y. This doesn’t tell us much
about whether x is better for Jim. The spectators might believe that x
is worse for Jim, but still prefer it on balance, despite their concern for
him, because they are equally concerned about the others. Requiring the
spectator’s preferences to be ‘sympathetic’ constitutes a viable solution to
the ‘wrong kind of preference’ problem in the intrapersonal case only if
the sympathy involved is an attitude of care and concern exclusively (or
at least largely)39 targeted at the subject.
One, interesting, variant of the intrapersonal case arises where the
spectator is identical to the subject. Spectator k has an extended preference
37

38

39

This formulation might need to be refined to handle the possibility of an ‘akratic’
sympathizer, who fully cares about the sympathy target, but is unmotivated by certain
beliefs regarding the target’s well-being. Modulo akrasia, the connection between
sympathy and well-being beliefs stated in the text would seem to be correct.
On some metaethical views, the fact that (x; i) k (y; j) for all spectators k at most provides
strong evidence that the first history is truly at least as good for well-being (that (x; i) WB
(y; j)), rather than guaranteeing this, even if the spectators are idealized. Such metaethical
views would reject the premise (which I embraced above) that if 1 = 2 = . . . = N =
, then WB = . They would also reject the axioms of Unanimous Indifference and
Unanimous Weak Superiority, discussed below in Part 5. Although I find such views
implausible, I cannot pursue the issue here – and thus say ‘arguably’ to leave open the
possibility of a purely evidential connection between extended preferences and truths
about well-being.
If a group of well-informed spectators are largely sympathetic to Jim, their preferences
do provide substantial evidence regarding his well-being. And, arguably, an attitude of
exclusive sympathy is psychologically unrealistic and unhealthy, while an attitude of
predominant sympathy is not. A possible refinement of my analysis of the intrapersonal
case, therefore, appeals to predominant rather than unreserved sympathy; but I do not
pursue the issue here.
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for (x; k) over (y; k). The sympathy-based conception analyses this as
an outcome preference on k’s part (a preference for x over y) under
a condition of wholehearted self-sympathy. ‘Self-sympathy’ means an
attitude of care and concern for the very same person who has the
attitude. The person who is the target of the sympathizer’s attitude is,
now, the sympathizer himself. ‘Self-sympathy’ is, perhaps, an unfamiliar
term. Here’s a synonym: ‘self-interest’. In short, the spectator’s extended
preferences for the case where he is subject are nothing other than his selfinterested outcome preferences.
The observation can be inverted. Wholehearted sympathy is a
generalization of self-interest – an attitude of interest in some particular
person, be it the holder of the attitude (self-interest), or someone else.
The spectator’s intrapersonal extended preferences are just rankings of
outcomes with this generalized self-interest directed at the appropriate
person, the subject.
Consider now the interpersonal case. It is tempting to propose: k
has an extended preference for (x; i) over (y; j), i and j distinct, iff
k prefers x over y under a condition of unreserved sympathy with
‘the subject’. However, this proposal fails. There is no one person to
be the target of the spectator’s sympathy in the interpersonal case.
And holding simultaneous attitudes of unreserved sympathy with two
different subjects is psychologically impossible. The spectator Robert
cannot, at the same time, care only about Maurice and only about Jean.40
Thus, it will not work to analyse Robert’s extended preference for (x;
Maurice) over (y; Jean) as a preference for x over y while simultaneously
being unreservedly sympathetic to both Maurice and Jean. Asking what
Robert would prefer with this impossible combination of attitudes would
be like asking what he prefers when simultaneously calm and panicky.
To be sure, Robert’s attitudes of sympathy can change. He can,
at one moment, feel unreservedly sympathetic to Maurice and, later,
unreservedly sympathetic to Jean. But a preference for one possible
outcome over a second is a synchronic relation between a preferrer and
the two possibilities, each simultaneously presented to his mind via some
mental representation. For Robert to stand in that synchronic relation to
outcomes x and y, and at that one moment in time to be wholeheartedly
sympathetic to two different people, is impossible.
Thus, in the interpersonal case, the account of extended preferences
presented here asks the spectator to make a judgement about well-being.
However, this analysis is a close cousin to the intrapersonal analysis.
Although sympathy does not necessitate explicit well-being judgements
– I can hold an attitude of sympathy for you without explicitly thinking
40

The same problem would arise if the requirement of unreserved sympathy were
weakened to predominant sympathy. See above note 39.
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about your well-being (or so it is plausible to believe) – sympathy is
responsive to such judgements, as already discussed. If I am sympathetic
to you, and come to believe/judge that some course of action benefits
you, then I am motivated to pursue that course of action. The affective
component of the intrapersonal analysis (wholehearted concern for the
sympathy target) cannot be transposed to the interpersonal case, but
the valuational component (the judgements about the target’s well-being
that motivate the sympathizer) can be. And that is what my account
does. Indeed, the very same implicit or explicit views about the nature
of well-being that motivate the sympathizer, in the intrapersonal case,
will determine his well-being ranking when he makes explicit well-being
judgements in the interpersonal case. For this reason, I describe the entire
account of extended preferences, both (1) and (2), as the ‘sympathy-based
conception’.41
Note that the interpersonal analysis, like its intrapersonal cousin,
avoids the ‘essential attribute’ and ‘wrong kind of preference’ objections.
A spectator can take account of all of the subjects’ attributes, including
their essential attributes, in arriving at his well-being judgements. A
judgement made by one spectator to the effect that i in x is at least as
well off as j in y is evidence that (x; i)WB (y; j), at least if the spectator
is suitably idealized. And such a judgement by all such spectators is
substantial evidence that (x; i)WB (y; j) – indeed, it arguably guarantees
that (x; i)WB (y; j).
What exactly is the relation between k and the profile R? Remember
that extended preferences (on both the empathy- and sympathy-based
account) are potentially dependent on individual tastes. But what does
such dependency involve, on the sympathy-based view?
First, there is a logical link between k and Rk . Given the definition
of intrapersonal extended preferences, it follows that spectator k has a
weak extended preference for (x; k) over (y; k) iff Rk is such that k has
a self-interested weak preference for outcome x over outcome y. Second,
there are empirical (not logical) links between k and each Ri , i  k. In
developing his intrapersonal extended preferences for histories belonging
to subjects other than himself, and in making across-subject comparisons,
the spectator k is permitted to take account of everyone else’s tastes.
41

Why not adopt the simpler strategy of defining both intra- and interpersonal extended
preferences in terms of well-being judgements – omitting any reference to sympathy?
The spectator’s extended preferences are genuinely preferences only in virtue of their
motivational connection to his choices. The account I have offered preserves that
connection: directly, in the intrapersonal case (the sympathetic spectator’s ranking of
outcomes, like other genuine outcome preferences, helps motivate his choices) and
indirectly, in the interpersonal case (in virtue of those judgements flowing from the
very same views about well-being that figure in the intrapersonal case). A single, purely
valuational account would sever this nexus to choice.
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Whether k does so depends upon his own tastes and values. For example,
k might make the judgement that (x; i) is better for well-being than (y; j)
given Ri and Rj , but not given Ri ∗ and Rj ∗ .
In the next Part, I will discuss how to derive WB from an array of
extended preferences (1 , . . . , k , . . . ,  N ), where Convergence fails. But
we should first consider three potential criticisms of the sympathy-based
conception of extended preferences, as well as the question of representing
k via utility functions.
One criticism is that the sympathy-based conception, used as an
analysis of well-being, is circular. In the interpersonal case, the circularity
is patent. In that case, the view says: Given Convergence, (x; i) WB
(y; j) iff everyone judges that i in x is at least as well off as j in y. So
well-being is ‘analysed’ in terms of well-being judgements – an obvious
circularity. In the intrapersonal case, the circularity is more subtle, but
still real. Even if sympathy does not require explicit thinking about the
target’s well-being, the attitude of sympathy has important connections
to well-being, described in the previous paragraphs. But (so the critique
goes) these connections are not happenstance. It is not as if sympathy is
some independently specified attitude which, as it happens, motivates
the holder to act in line with his judgements about the target’s wellbeing, if he makes such judgements. Rather, this is a defining feature of
the attitude: sympathy has conceptual, not just empirical, connections to
well-being judgements and beliefs.42 Insofar as the concept of well-being
is used to identify the attitude of sympathy, which in turn is used – by the
view tendered here – to analyse intrapersonal extended preferences and,
thereby, intrapersonal well-being comparisons, the view is circular.
However, the circularities just described are not vicious circularities.
Consider the interpersonal case (if the circularity is not vicious here,
then a fortiori it is not in the intrapersonal case). To analyse a value
relation between two items in terms of that very value relation is viciously
circular. But the sympathy-based conception does not do that. Rather, it
analyses a value relation in terms of individuals’ beliefs and judgements
about that relation. What we have, here, is not troubling circularity, but
a kind of self-reference. The value relation WB is instantiated just in
case individuals have certain thoughts, thoughts about that very relation.
This sort of self-reference is familiar from the literature on secondary
properties.43 An object has the property of redness if it has surface
42

43

Darwall seems to suggest otherwise: ‘[C]are or concern exists as a natural psychological
kind for us to refer to . . . If concern or care for someone for his sake is a natural
psychological kind, then we can make use of it in a theory of welfare without having
to define it’ (Darwall 2002: 12). If Darwall is correct, here, then the circularity challenge to
the sympathy-based conception of extended preferences is yet weaker.
See Smith et al. (1989), Darwall et al. (1992), Casati and Tappolet (1998), Miller (2003: chs 7,
9–10).
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reflectance characteristics which make it look red to normal observers.
Note, here, how persons’ perceptions or judgements of redness are an
ineliminable aspect of the property of redness.
The characterization of interpersonal comparisons in terms of wellbeing judgements and beliefs is, indeed, quite useful. One way of gaining
evidence about whether (x; i)WB (y; j) is by asking individuals (with
good information, thinking clearly, etc.) whether they believe that i in x is
better off than j in y. (By analogy, the process of constructing a successful
device to detect red objects would involve asking observers which objects
look red.) Turn this coin over: the very usefulness of this characterization
underscores that it is not viciously circular. By contrast, the sham ‘analysis’
of WB in terms of well-being (rather than thoughts about well-being)
offers no basis for determining whether i or j is indeed better off.
To be sure, the sympathy-based conception is not value-free. It links
well-being to thoughts about well-being. Thus the analysis, although
not viciously circular, is not as ‘nice’ as a characterization of well-being
wholly in terms of non-value facts and non-evaluative thoughts. But
philosophical efforts to produce a value-free analysis of well-being have
been a failure. In particular, no value-free solution to the ‘wrong kind of
preference’ problem has yet succeeded
A second critique of the sympathy-based conception is that it fails to
satisfy what Harsanyi calls the ‘Principle of Acceptance’. This principle
says that a spectator’s extended preferences track the subject’s outcome
preferences in the intrapersonal case.
Principle of Acceptance: (x; i)k (y; i) iff Ri is such that i weakly
prefers x to y.
The Principle of Acceptance was a central element of Harsanyi’s account
of extended preferences.44
However, the Principle of Acceptance is not a plausible component
of the sympathy-based conception of extended preferences. The Principle,
as just formulated, runs afoul of the ‘wrong kind of preference’ problem.
Imagine that i prefers x to y on non-self-interested grounds. In such a
case – given the connection between extended preferences and WB – it
is problematic to require that k extendedly prefer (x; i) to (y; i).
A refinement to the Principle of Acceptance makes it more plausible.
Modified Principle of Acceptance: (x; i)k (y; i) iff Ri is such that i
self-interestedly weakly prefers x to y.
However, this principle is far from compelling. I may care wholeheartedly
about you, but refuse to take your views about your well-being as
decisive. Sympathetic preferences may, in some cases, be paternalistic.
This can occur, for example, where (1) the sympathizer gives more weight
44

Harsanyi (1977: 52)
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to some aspect of well-being than the target; and (2) the sympathizer
believes that the realization of this aspect of well-being is sufficiently
insensitive to the target’s preferences. For example, the sympathizer may
give greater emphasis to health; the target, to enjoyment. Moreover, the
sympathizer believes (correctly) that a strong preference for health is not
a precondition for its realization; people who care little for their health
can still end up healthy. In one outcome, the target has a healthy but less
enjoyable lifestyle; in a second, he is more indulgent but harms his health.
The target self-interestedly prefers the second outcome; the sympathizer,
caring wholeheartedly about the target, and knowing of his preference,
believes that he undervalues health, and prefers the first outcome.
The Modified Principle of Acceptance precludes the spectator from
ever having an intrapersonal history ranking that deviates from the
subject’s. This is arguably too strong. By contrast, the sympathy-based
conception (without that principle) permits the spectator to take account
of the subject’s preferences, without requiring the spectator to take those
preferences as decisive. For example, the spectator believes that reading
great literature or seeing great art makes a larger contribution to the
target’s well-being than watching sit-coms on TV, but only if the target
himself has a taste for these more refined pursuits. The spectator thus
extendedly prefers a history in which the target spends his free time
experiencing art or literature, rather than sit-coms, iff the target selfinterestedly prefers to spend his time this way. The sympathy-based
conception of extended preferences (without the Modified Principle of
Acceptance) permits this.
Still, some readers may wish to embrace the Modified Principle of
Acceptance. They may argue: ‘It is true that a sympathizer k whose
attitude of sympathy is targeted at some other person i may act
paternalistically towards i. However, the best account of well-being is
strongly non-paternalistic, in the following sense. If i is sufficiently
idealized, and is ranking outcomes under a condition of self-sympathy (selfinterest), then one outcome is at least as good for i as a second iff i weakly
prefers the first – regardless of what others may prefer, and even if these
others are also idealized, and also sympathetic towards i’.
Whether the most attractive account of well-being is strongly
non-paternalistic, in the sense just described, is controversial. The
sympathy-based model of extended preferences will yield a strongly
non-paternalistic account of well-being if it is revised to incorporate the
Modified Principle of Acceptance.
The Sympathy-Based Conception (incorporating the Modified
Principle of Acceptance)
(1) Intrapersonal case: (x; i)k (y; i) iff Ri is such that i has a selfinterested weak preference for outcome x over outcome y.
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(2) Interpersonal case: (x; i)k (y; j), with i and j distinct, iff spectator k
makes the judgement that i in x is at least as well off as j in y, given
the profile of tastes in R.
A third criticism of the sympathy-based conception (in both the original
version and revised to incorporate the Modified Principle of Acceptance)
is that nothing in my definitions of intra- and interpersonal extended
preferences ensures that k is a quasiordering of H. For example, the
spectator might have well-behaved intrapersonal rankings, and then
make interpersonal judgements that yield an intransitivity.
The answer, here, is that k should treat his initial intra- and
interpersonal rankings as provisional, and be willing to revise them to
avoid intransitivity. Think of this as a rationality requirement on extended
preferences. How k should engage in this revision process, so as to
maximize consistency with his initial rankings, is a complicated topic that
I will not attempt to address. It is clear, however, that if each of k’s N
intrapersonal rankings (his rankings of outcomes under a condition of
sympathy with each subject) is itself a quasiordering, then these and his
interpersonal rankings can always be revised in some fashion so that k is
a quasiordering which never contradicts (either conforms to or ‘extends’)
the initial intrapersonal rankings.45

45

Assume that each initial intrapersonal ranking is a quasiordering. k conforms to such
ranking where: (x; i) k (y; i) iff k initially ranks (x; i) at least as good as (y; i), i.e.
initially weakly prefers x to y under a condition of sympathy with i. k extends each
initial ranking where: (x; i) is initially ranked better than (y; i) implies (x; i) k (y; i),
and (x; i) is initially ranked equal to (y; i) implies (x; i) k (y; i). (1) A trivial strategy. If k
revises his interpersonal judgements so that all histories belonging to different subjects
are judged to be incomparable, then k will be a quasiordering that conforms to his
initial intrapersonal rankings. To be sure, this strategy will not be helpful in arriving at
a WB that makes interpersonal comparisons! (2) Another trivial strategy. If k makes the
interpersonal judgement that every history of subject 1 is worse than every history of
subject 2, every history of subject 2 is worse than every history of subject 3, etc., then
k will be a quasiordering that conforms to his initial intrapersonal rankings. (3) A more
interesting strategy. (2) Let Ei be an ordering extension of k’s initial intrapersonal ranking of
subject i’s histories. Assume that Ei is representable by utility function fi (.), a real-valued
function on O: history (x; i) is ranked by Ei at least as good as (y; i) iff fi (x)  fi (y). Let J
be the set of pairs of histories (a subset of H × H) such that for every pair ((x; i), (y; j)) in
J, i  j and such that k makes the provisional well-being judgement that the first history
is at least as good as the second. Let J∗ be a finite subset of J, containing k’s ‘privileged’
judgements. Let ϕ 1 (.), ϕ 2 (.), . . . , ϕ N (.) be monotonically increasing real-valued functions
with real domain. For a given profile of such functions, let F(x; i) = ϕ i (fi (x)). For a given
pair of histories in J∗ , ((x; i), (y; j)), let us say that F(.) is ‘consistent’ with that pair iff F(x;
i)  F(y; j). Pick any ϕ 1 ∗ (.), ϕ 2 ∗ (.), . . . , ϕ N ∗ (.), so that F∗ (.) associated with this profile
maximizes the number of judgements in J∗ with which F∗ (.) is consistent. Now, let k
revise his interpersonal and intrapersonal rankings so that for any two histories (x; i) and
(y; j), with the two subjects distinct or identical, (x; i) k (y; j) iff F∗ (x; i)  F∗ (y; j). Then
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A final topic concerns the representation of extended preferences via
utility numbers. Assume, first, that k is a complete quasiordering of the
set H of histories. Standard results in utility theory show that, if H is finite
or countable, k can be represented by a single utility function vk (.) such
that (x; i)k (y; j) iff v k (x; i) ≥ v k (y; j). Such a vk (.) may (but need not) exist
if k is complete and H is uncountable;46 and of course no single utility
function can represent an incomplete quasiordering of H. However, every
k – whether complete or incomplete, and regardless of the cardinality of
H – can be represented by some set of utility functions Vk , such that (x; i)
k (y; j) iff vk (x; i)  vk (y; j) for all vk (.) in Vk .47
5. CONSTRUCTING WELL-BEING COMPARISONS
Convergence can fail – even if the Modified Principle of Acceptance
is adopted, and a fortiori if it is rejected. For example, two spectators
can make different interpersonal judgements, because of a disagreement
about the sources of well-being. We thus face the interesting question
of constructing WB where spectators need not have the same extended
preferences.48
Formally, we are looking for a rule that takes a profile P of extended
preferences over set H, P = (1 , 2 , 3 , . . . ,  N ), and maps this profile
onto a well-being quasiordering of H, WB .49 I will use the symbol
kP to mean the extended preferences of spectator k under profile P,
and WB (P) to mean the well-being quasiordering associated with P –
dropping the ‘P’ where the particular profile at issue is clear from context.
A statement of identity between extended preferences, namely, kP = lQ ,
means that for all (x; i) and (y; j) in H, (x; i)kP (y; j) iff (x; i)lQ (y; j).
Similarly, WB (P) = WB (Q) means that, for all (x; i) and (y; j) in
H, (x; i)WB (P)(y; j) iff (x; i)WB (Q)(y; j). Extended preferences can be

46
47
48

49

these revised rankings will yield a quasiordering k that extends k’s initial intrapersonal
rankings.
See Kreps (1988).
See Evren and Ok (2011); see also Donaldson and Weymark (1998).
This problem seems to have been little discussed. Roberts (1997) is an important exception.
However, he focuses on individual extended utility functions on H as the inputs and a
collective (‘objective’) extended utility function as the output – thus presupposing that
WB is complete. The literature on ‘extensive social choice’ (see Suzumura 1996; Ooghe
and Lauwers 2005) is also relevant, but focuses on the social ranking of outcomes given
the plurality of extended utility functions, rather than determining a collective judgement
of well-being.
Although P itself depends on the profile R of individual tastes, I assume that WB does not
depend directly on those tastes. Let P(R) be the profile of extended preferences associated
with R. Strictly, WB is a function of both R and P(R), but I assume that WB (R, P(R)) is
such that if P(R) = P(R∗ ), then WB (R, P(R)) = WB (R∗ , P(R∗ )).
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heterogeneous (Convergence can fail), i.e. it is possible that kP = lP , with
k and l different individuals.
This problem, obviously, has an Arrovian ‘feel’. But it differs in critical
respects from the classic Arrow problem. First, the ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’
need only be quasiorderings, not complete orderings. Second, what we
are after is not a social ranking of outcomes, but a ranking of histories in
light of well-being.
One plausible rule is the Pooling Rule: (x; i)WB (P)(y; j) iff
(x; i)kP (y; j) for all spectators k. This Rule can also be expressed in
terms of utility functions. The quasiordering WB , however constructed,
can always be represented by some set V of utility functions such that
(x; i)WB (y; j) iff v(x; i)  v(y; j) for all v(.) in V. In the case of the Pooling
Rule, V is simply the union of V1 , V2 , . . . , V N , where Vk represents k .
The Pooling Rule satisfies various plausible axioms: Unanimous
Indifference and Weak Superiority, Independence, Spectator and Subject
Anonymity, and either Strong or Weak Non-paternalism.
‘Unanimity’ axioms say that universal spectator judgements are
decisive with respect to well-being. Well-being facts are accessible to the
community of spectators (at least idealized ones). It is not possible for
everyone to be wrong about well-being. Formally, these are analogous to
the Pareto principles in social choice.
Unanimous Indifference: (x; i) ∼kP (y; j) for all k implies
(x; i)∼WB (P)(y; j).
Unanimous Weak Superiority: (x; i)kP (y; j) for all k implies
(x; i)WB (P)(y; j).
The Independence Axiom says that the well-being ranking of any pair of
histories is wholly determined by spectators’ preferences between those
histories.
Independence: Let profiles P and Q and histories (x; i) and
(y; j) be such that: for all k, (x; i)kP (y; j) iff (x; i)kQ (y; j). Then
(x; i)WB (P)(y; j) iff (x; i)WB (Q)(y; j).
‘Independence’ is, of course, the analogue of Arrow’s ‘Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives’. The former seems considerably more plausible
than the latter. In determining whether some outcome x is socially
preferred, dispreferred, or indifferent to some other outcome y (the Arrow
problem), we may well want to take into consideration more information
than the affected individuals’ ordinal rankings of the outcomes – in
particular, information about the pattern of interpersonally comparable
well-being in both outcomes. By contrast, the problem at hand is to arrive
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at a basis for ascriptions of interpersonally comparable well-being, as a
function of spectators’ extended preferences. What relevant information
about spectators’ extended preferences is excluded by Independence?
Spectator anonymity expresses the idea that everyone’s well-being
views have equal weight. Subject anonymity expresses the idea that
the well-being ranking of a given subject’s histories does not depend
upon the identity of the subject (were the spectators to have the same
extended preferences with respect to someone else’s histories, the wellbeing ranking would be the same).
Let π be any permutation mapping on the set of N subjects and
spectators.
π(k)

Spectator Anonymity: If kP =  Q for all k, then WB (P) = WB (Q).
Subject Anonymity: For all k, let kP and kQ be such that, for all
histories (x; i) and (y; j), (x; i)kP (y; j) iff (x; π (i))kQ (y; π ( j)). Then
(x; i)WB (P)(y; j) iff (x; π (i))WB (Q)(y; π ( j)).
Non-paternalism axioms give a special role to each subject in ranking his
own histories. Strong non-paternalism says that the well-being ranking of
a given subject’s histories is identical to the subject’s extended preferences
over those histories. If spectators are required to construct extended
preferences in accordance with the Modified Principle of Acceptance, the
Pooling Rule satisfies strong non-paternalism. If extended preferences
can violate that principle, the Pooling Rule can violate strong nonpaternalism, but it still satisfies weak non-paternalism – namely, that the
well-being ranking of a subject’s histories will never directly contradict
the subject’s own ranking.
Strong Non-paternalism: (x; i)WB (P)(y; i) iff (x; i)iP (y; i).
Weak Non-paternalism: If (x; i)iP (y; i), then not (y; i)WB (P)(x; i).
Notwithstanding its axiomatic virtues, the Pooling Rule might be
criticized for producing ‘too much’ incompleteness in WB . Note,
specifically, that two histories will be non-comparable if some spectator
ranks them as non-comparable, or if two spectators have conflicting strict
extended preferences over the histories.50
50

Two histories (x; i) and (y; j) are non-comparable if not (x; i) WB (P) (y; j) and
not (y; j) WB (P) (x; i). Under the Pooling Rule, either of the following suffices for
non-comparability: (1) there exists k such that not (x; i) kP (y; j) and not (y; j)
kP (x; i); (2) there exist k, l, such that (x; i) Pk (y; j) and (y; j) Pl (x; i). Note
also that if the Modified Principle of Acceptance is posited, non-comparability arises
between two histories with the same subject iff she ranks them as non-comparable:
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The force of this criticism is open to dispute. It might be argued
that if facts about well-being just are facts about the convergent idealized
extended preferences of a community of spectators, divergence in their
views about two histories should yield well-being non-comparability
between the two.51 However, it is certainly important to investigate
plausible rules for constructing WB other than the Pooling Rule. This is a
topic for future research.
6. WELL-BEING DIFFERENCES
Extended preferences (as described thus far) provide ordinal information
about spectators’ views regarding the histories in H. Whether (x; i) k
(y; j) depends upon k’s ordering of (x; i) and (y; j), more specifically
whether he judges (x; i) to be at least as good as (y; j) if the two subjects are
distinct, and whether he ranks x at least as good as y under a condition of
sympathy with the subject if i = j. Similarly, WB is ordinal: (x; i)WB (y; j)
means that the well-being level of i in x is at least as large as the well-being
level of j in y.
The difference quasiordering DIFF is a natural way to represent
cardinal well-being facts regarding the histories in H. DIFF is a quasiordering on H × H : ((x; i), (y; j))DIFF ((z; l), (w; m)) is to be interpreted as: the
difference in well-being between (x; i) and (y; j) is at least as large as the
difference in well-being between (z; l) and (w; m). Moreover, so as to reflect
truisms about well-being differences, and their connection to well-being
levels, DIFF must satisfy certain additional ‘Difference Constraints’.52

51
52

not (x; i) WB (P) (y; i) and not (y; i) WB (P) (x; i) iff not (x; i) iP (y; i) and not
(y; i) iP (x; i).
Cf. Smith (1994: 173), proposing that normative facts are facts about convergent idealized
preferences.
If S = {a, b, c . . . } is an arbitrary set, with D understood as a ranking of the differences
between the elements of S, D cannot merely be a quasiordering (reflexive, transitive,
binary relation) on S x S. In order to capture our intuitive understanding of how
differences behave, D will need to satisfy additional constraints. What these might be
is suggested by the scholarly literature on difference quasiorderings. See, e.g. Köbberling
(2006); Krantz et al. (2007: 150–157). Difference Constraints should surely include the
following: Reversal: (a, b) D (c, d) iff (d, c) D (b, a). Separability: If (a, b) D (c, b) then
(a, b∗ ) D (c, b∗ ) for all b∗ ; and if (a, b) D (a, c), then (a∗ , b) D (a∗ , c) for all a∗ . Neutrality:
(a, a) D (b, b) for all a, b. Concatenation: If (a, b) D (aʹ, bʹ) and (b, c) D (bʹ, cʹ) then (a, c)
D (aʹ, cʹ). Linkage: The ranking  of S to which D is meant to correspond must satisfy
the following requirement: a  b iff (a, b) D (b, b).
These would apply to WB and DIFF as follows. First, DIFF will not only be
a quasiordering of H x H, but will satisfy Reversal, Separability, Neutrality and
Concatenation (and any other such Difference Constraints not logically implied by these,
if there are any). For example, Reversal applied to DIFF means: ((x; i), (y; j)) DIFF ((z; l),
(w; m)) iff ((w; m), (z; l)) DIFF ((y; j), (x; i)). Second, DIFF will satisfy Linkage vis-à-vis
WB , that is: (x; i) WB (y; j) iff ((x; i), (y; j)) DIFF ((y; j), (y; j)).
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If WB is a complete quasiordering on H, and DIFF a complete
quasiordering on H x H that satisfies the Difference Constraints, then
(depending on whether further technical conditions are satisfied) they
may be jointly representable by a single utility function v(.), such
that: (x; i)WB (y; j) iff v(x; i)v(y; j) and ((x; i), (y; j))DIFF ((z; l), (w; m))
iff v(x; i) − v(y; j)v(z; l) − v(w; m). By extension, if WB is a possibly
incomplete quasiordering on H, and DIFF a possibly incomplete
quasiordering on H x H that satisfies the Difference Constraints,
they may be jointly representable by a set of utility functions V
such that: (x; i)WB (y; j) iff v(x; i)v(y; j) for all v(.) in V; and
((x; i), (y; j))DIFF ((z; l), (w; m)) iff v(x; i) − v(y; j)v(z; l) − v(w; m) for all
v(.) in V.53
How are we to construct DIFF , as a function of spectators’ preferences
and well-being judgements? This is a large and complicated topic, which
I lack space to discuss in detail here. However, two basic possibilities
should be noted. The first strategy is to invite spectators to make their
own judgements about well-being differences.54 For any given fourtuple of histories, spectator k asks herself: do I believe the well-being
difference between the first two to be at least as large as the wellbeing difference between the second two? If spectator k’s difference
judgements are sufficiently coherent, they will take the form of a personal
difference quasiordering k-Diff : a quasiordering on H × H which satisfies
the Difference Constraints vis-à-vis k . We can then formulate some
rule (e.g. a Pooling Rule) for mapping a profile of such judgements
(1-Diff , 2-Diff , . . . ,  N-Diff ) onto DIFF .
Note that this strategy does not create a direct connection
between spectator k’s personal difference quasiordering, k-Diff , and her
preferences when sympathetic to various subjects. Still, there remains
a substantial, indirect connection – since k-Diff must satisfy Difference
Constraints relative to k , and k does have a direct nexus to the
spectator’s sympathetic preferences. Recall that (x; i) k (y; i) iff spectator
k weakly prefers x to y when unreservedly sympathetic to subject i. These
53

54

On the representation of a complete difference quasiordering by a utility function, see
Köbberling (2006); Krantz et al. (2007: 150–157). By ‘technical conditions’, I mean axioms
such as ‘Archimedean’ or ‘solvability’ which figure in these representation proofs, but do
not seem to be part of the very concept of a ranking of differences – by contrast with the
requirements I have labelled ‘Difference Constraints’.
Adler (2012: ch. 3) constructs a set V that pools the extended utility functions of a
group of spectators, and then defines WB and DIFF from V using the set-valued rule
stated in the text. (No attempt is made there to describe the technical conditions generally
guaranteeing that any WB and DIFF are representable by a set V.) It is worth noting that
if a quasiordering WB on H and a difference quasiordering DIFF on H × H are indeed
representable by a set V using the set-valued rule, DIFF will satisfy all of the Difference
Constraints mentioned in the footnote immediately above.
See Abdellaoui et al. (2007).
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sympathetic preferences will, in turn, help structure k-Diff . For example,
if k under a condition of unreserved sympathy with i weakly prefers
outcome x to y to z, i.e. (x; i)k (y; i)k (z; i), then k -Diff must assign a
difference between (x; i) and (z; i) at least as large as the difference between
(y; i) and (z; i).
A second strategy (call it the Bernoulli strategy) is to involve
sympathy more directly in k -Diff .55 Let uik (.) be a vNM utility function
that expectationally represents spectator k’s preferences over outcome
lotteries under a condition of unreserved sympathy with subject i. Then the
Bernoulli strategy uses uik (.) to define k -Diff in the intrapersonal case, with
respect to subject i’s histories: ((x; i), (y; i))k -Diff ((z; i), (w; i)) iff uik (x) −
uik (y)uik (z) − uik (w).56 As with the first strategy, DIFF is constructed from
(1-Diff , 2-Diff , . . . ,  N-Diff ) using a Pooling Rule or some other rule.
While Harsanyi’s derivation of difference comparisons from vNM
utility functions was empathy-based, the Bernoulli strategy here is
sympathy-based. Harsanyi asked spectators to rank lotteries over histories,
with the spectator meant to think about the probability assigned by a
lottery to a history (x; i) as the probability that the spectator will ‘stand
in the shoes’ (acquire the attributes) of subject i in outcome x. By contrast,
the Bernoulli strategy under discussion now asks each spectator to rank, in
turn, N subsets of lotteries over histories – the subset consisting of lotteries
over histories that have individual 1 as subject and thus take the form
(x; 1), the subset consisting of lotteries over histories of the form (x; 2),
. . . , the subset consisting of lotteries over histories of the form (x; N) –
with each such ranking understood as the spectator’s ranking of lotteries
over outcomes when unreservedly sympathetic with the given subject. The
spectator is never asked to imagine acquiring someone else’s identity.
Still, the Bernoulli strategy will be controversial.57 It is a truism
about sympathy that my judgements about your welfare levels in various
outcomes are mirrored by my preferences over those outcomes when
unreservedly sympathetic to you. It may be true, but is hardly a truism,
that my judgements about differences between your welfare levels in
55
56

57

See Adler (2012: ch. 3).
What about the interpersonal case, i.e., ((x; i), (y; j)) k-Diff ((z; l), (w; m)), where it is not the
case that i = j = l = m? The Bernoulli strategy cannot define k-Diff in the interpersonal
case with reference to k’s ranking of outcomes under a condition of unreserved sympathy
with ‘the subject’, since there are multiple subjects. (This is, of course, exactly the same
problem that arose in using sympathy to define k in the interpersonal case, as discussed
in Part 4.) Rather, in the interpersonal case, the Bernoulli strategy must be either (a) to ask
k to make judgements of well-being differences; or (b) to derive k-Diff from uik (.) and k .
Adler (2012: ch. 3) in effect does the latter.
As already noted, the existing literature on Harsanyi contains criticisms of his use of
vNM utility functions to derive well-being differences. See above note 11. These criticisms
are independent of his empathy-based conception of extended preferences, and would
therefore also apply to the sympathy-based Bernoulli strategy now under discussion.
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various outcomes are mirrored by differences in the values of a vNM
utility function expectationally representing my preferences for lotteries
over those outcomes when unreservedly sympathetic to you. Imagine that
k, under a condition of sympathy with subject i, strictly prefers outcome z
to y to x; and k makes the judgement that the difference between i’s wellbeing in z and y is exactly equal to the difference in his well-being between
y and x. Why are we justified in insisting (as the Bernoulli strategy does)
that spectator k, under a condition of sympathy with i, must now be
indifferent between y and a lottery giving a 50% probability of z and a
50% probability of x? Why would it be incoherent or problematic for k to
rank y above or below this lottery?
A full analysis of the pros and cons of the two strategies for defining
k-Diff must be left to another day.58 What should be emphasized, here,
is that each represents an intellectual extension of the sympathy-based
conception of extended preferences. The first strategy asks spectator
k to make well-being judgements, regarding differences, just as the
construction of k , in the interpersonal case, asks spectator k to make
judgements of well-being levels. The second, Bernoulli, strategy brings
sympathy into the picture more directly. Moreover, as already noted, the
first strategy is indirectly constrained by the use of sympathy in defining
k . Neither strategy employs the problematic device of empathetic
projection.
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